(here abbreviated F* e) is deducible absolutely. If this were true for unrestricted hi the system would be inconsistent.
In [ACT] (see [CLg], p. 385) a formulation of the theory was given in terms of two axiom schemes [SK] and [ES]
; also it was claimed that the theory is consistent if the values of the Greek letters are restricted to certain "canonical obs", and that the deduction theorem holds for m= 1 with substitutions for the free variables in the axiom schemes limited to canonical obs. It is now known that, under the same canonicalness restrictions, the general case of the theorem holds if the axiom schemes can be extended by a process of "canonical generalization", i.e. replacement of a free variable a by aX ... .xm and application of the transformation from F I to F* I (for unspecified ti and m). 
G. KREISEL. The non-derivability of .-,(x)A (x) -+ (Ex) -A (x)
,
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is only provable if one of the alternatives is provable, and so, by G6del's construction of formally undecidable formulae (x)A(x) with primitive recursive A, each of the systems considered contains A for which -n(x)A(x) -+ (Ex)-nA(x) is not provable. The behavior of an automaton, as opposed to its structure, deals with the relation between inputs and outputs; more precisely, the exact manner in which the inputs determine the outputs. In this talk I investigate the capability of several languages for describing the behavior of automata. Some of these languages are in the form of symbolic logic; others are not. Some theorems are proved about the adequacy of these languages, and problems for future logical research are pointed out. (6) and a rule of necessitation. E has the same theorems as II' without (y) (though adding (y) to E does not yield II'). (IV) Define proof that A entails B as a proof of B from hypothesis A which satisfies the following conditions: (a) stars can be prefixed to steps of the proof as required by the following rules: (i) the hypothesis is starred; (ii) a step introduced as an axiom is not starred; (iii) the conclusion of an application of (a) is starred if and only if at least one premiss is starred; (iv) the conclusion of an application of (i) is starred if both premisses are starred, and unstarred if both premisses are unstarred (and no use of (i) has one premiss starred and the other unstarred); and (b), in consequence of the rules of (a), B has a star. (The conditions are designed to explicate what we might mean by saying that B "really depends on" A (Ackermann's logischer Zusammenhang).)
ALAN
Our principal interest in E (as opposed to II' and fI") is that for E we have the following: Entailment theorem. F We shall refer to the set of G6del numbers of the provable sentences and the set of G6del numbers of the refutable sentences of a theory T as the nuclei of T. We call T a Rosser theory iff every disjoint pair (A, B) of r.e. sets is strongly separable in the theory, in the sense that there exists a formula F(x) such that for every n E A, F(n) is provable, and for every n E B, F(n) is refutable in T. It is easy to show that the nuclei of a Rosser theory are recursively inseparable -in fact effectively inseparable; a fortiori every Rosser theory is essentially creative (i.e. all its consistent extensions are creative). In fact we easily prove the stronger theorem "Let (A, B) be strongly separable in T. Then ( , and give a normal form for (B' ). This method is easily extended to many other topological spaces. Proceeding by induction on the type we can obtain the countable functionals (which correspond to (C)) and the recursively countable functionals (which correspond to (C')) as defined by KLEENE and KREISEL; but for these higher types the notion of countability thus defined is not identical with the notion of continuity.
MARIAN BOYKAN POUR-EL. Computable functionals.
In B1(x1), ... Bn(c1,  .. ., cn)] for all a: CB is not h.a. realizable. Definition. W is called stable (with respect  to h.a. closure) if there is a d, d e 0 The n-valued logics and the lattices of n-valued functions. The ordinary two-valued logic is regarded mathematically as a Boolean lattice and since each Boolean lattice can, as was shown by Stone, be represented by a lattice of two-valued functions on a set R (which is equivalent to the lattice of subsets of R), we may consider such a lattice of two-valued functions as a mathematical representation of the ordinary two-valued logic. Extending this view point to the case of manyvalued logics, we shall here first find the characteristic properties of a lattice of nvalued functions on a set R and then induce a complete set of axioms for this lattice which may be considered at the same time to represent the axioms for an n-valued logic, too. For Vice-President,
